About Cooperation, Selfishness and Joint Risks in Clusters by Gedai, Endre et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
About Cooperation, Selfishness and Joint
Risks in Clusters
Endre Gedai and La´szlo´ A´. Ko´czy and Gerd Meier zu Ko¨cker
and Zita Zombori
Institute for Innovation and Technology, Danish Agency for Science
Technology and Innovation
3. February 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65053/
MPRA Paper No. 65053, posted 15. June 2015 13:24 UTC
Cluster Games II
About Cooperation, Selfishness and Joint Risks  
in Clusters
Endre Gedai, László Á. Kóczy, G. Meier zu Köcker, Zita Zombori
Imprint
Institut für Innovation und Technik (iit)
in der VDI/VDE-IT
Steinplatz 1
10623 Berlin
Germany
Tel.: +49 30 310078-111
Fax: +49 30 310078-222
E-Mail: info@iit-berlin.de
www.iit-berlin.de
Authors
Endre Gedai
László Á. Kóczy
Zita Zombori
Layout: J. Büttner, A.-S. Piehl, VDI/VDE-IT
Copenhagen, Berlin 2015
Executive summary 
This study introduces an entirely novel way to study the co-
operative and noncooperative nature of clusters by looking at 
the selfish, profit-seeking interests of the actors within cluster 
initiatives. The approach provides a game theory inspired 
framework to study the dilemma of cluster actors between 
the fruitful cooperation with other actors and their own self-
ish – and possibly short-term – interests at three levels: intensity 
focussing on the overall cooperation effort; structure looking at 
the network of cooperation and balance discussing good ways 
to allocate resources. Characteristic models of cluster behaviour 
have been developed for all these aspects.
Interviews have been conducted among cluster actors of two 
cluster initiatives. Both were quite matured and well man-
aged with similar core objectives. The methodology applied 
has revealed that the nature of cooperation among the ac-
tors and how the cluster initiative is managed is of surpris-
ingly different nature although both cluster initiatives pro-
vide high added value by the cluster actors perspective. One 
cluster initiative can be characterised as a “managed cooper-
ation cluster”, where the management has a central role to 
match actors, while the nature of the other cluster initiative 
is more “a peer-to-peer cooperation cluster” where cooper-
ation emerges directly between cluster actors and the cluster 
management has another role. The results of the study lead 
to conclusions that there is not one ideal way how to manage 
cluster initiative. Furthermore the cluster actors cannot be seen 
as a homogenous group. Even if all of them have similar ob-
jectives like increased innovation capabilities, higher competi- 
tiveness, higher profitability etc. their intension why joining a 
cluster initiative and the readiness to contribute or just to bene-
fit is very different. The cluster management has to understand 
what are the particular interests and to what extent a dedicat-
ed cluster is ready to contribute. Applying the game theory in-
spired analytical approach helps to gain important inside views 
for cluster management. 
Furthermore the study shows that the way how cluster initia-
tives are set up and supported by public authorities does have 
a strong implication on the nature of cooperation and selfish-
ness among the cluster actors. The conclusion from the study is, 
among others, that high public funding facilitates the creation 
of cluster initiatives, but also attracts free riders to join since the 
barriers to enter are quite low. Having such an interest group 
“on board” within a cluster initiative hampers further trust 
building and cooperative framework conditions since selfish 
actors dominate. Low public funding at the beginning of the 
life of a cluster initiative leads to higher barriers due to higher 
mandatory investments of cluster participants, but creates a co-
operative environment since mainly those actors have joint that 
are really interested to cooperate and take common risks. 
However, the study has shown that good cluster managements 
can deal with different cooperative natures among cluster par-
ticipants, if they are aware of this and implement proper ac-
tions.
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1 In this document the following definitions for clusters and CM organisations are used: 
 Cluster is considered as a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field linked by  
 commonalities and complementarities' (Porter, 1998).
 Cluster (management) organisation is a specialised institution which is responsible for managing a cluster (initiative). These institutions take  
 on various legal forms.
 Cluster actors (participants) are the companies and associated institutions that are gathered in a cluster.
 CI are organised effort to increase growth and competitiveness of clusters within a region (Sölvell et al., 2003).
1 Introduction
This paper introduces an entirely novel way to study clusters 
by looking at the selfish, profit-seeking interests of the actors 
within cluster initiatives. The approach provides a game theory 
inspired framework to study the dilemma of cluster actors (CAs) 
between the fruitful cooperation with other CAs and their own 
selfish – and possibly short-term – interests. 
Clusters are defined as regional agglomeration of firms that 
compete and cooperate among each other (Porter, 1998). 
When it comes to organised efforts to increase networking and 
cooperation among cluster firms, often coordinated by a clus-
ter organisation (cluster management, CM), the term “cluster 
initiative (CI)” shall be used. CI can be seen as joint undertaking 
of cluster firms, research community and government within a 
region, to increase growth and competitiveness (Sölvell, Lind-
quist, & Ketels, 2003). The main activities of a CI is driven by 
the cluster actors' (CAs') interests in staying competitive, im-
proving competitiveness and obtaining high profits. Thus, from 
a company's perspective a CI can be considered as promising 
framework or a tool to satisfy these interests. That is also the 
reason, why the cluster approach is that high on policy makers' 
agendas since many years. 
However, cooperation and the actors' selfish interests should be 
kept in balance or else the success of the CI is in jeopardy: its ac-
tors can lose both joint and individual profits. Organic relation-
ships and cooperation among companies or a favourable busi-
ness environment is, by no means, a guarantee for a successful 
CI. CIs operating at industrial concentration points, having a 
critical mass, a supporting environment, and a successful cluster 
CM may, despite all this, lack success. On the other hand, other 
CIs operating in suboptimal circumstances in theory, flourish 
and produce a high extra profit in practice. This puzzle cries for 
new models, new approaches for a better understanding of the 
opportunities and decisions that drive the CIs and their actors. 
Seeing a CI as a marriage among the CAs, this study aims to 
provide mechanisms that reveal if the CAs are compatible and 
if not, how to prepare them for a successful relationship. But 
unlike in a marriage the personalities of the CAs may be easier 
to understand, and model by economic, especially game theo-
retic means. 
The approach and methodology of this study is based on a pre-
vious, more theoretical-oriented work. As a result of this un-
dertaking (Gedai, Kóczy, & Zombori, 2012) a dozen hypotheses 
about the way CAs operate in CIs had been developed. The 
main objective of the current study is to verify these hypotheses 
by applying a more practical methodology, based on the game 
theoretic approach (see section 6.1).
This work is based on the detailed study of two CIs. The struc-
ture of the paper is accordingly the following. First the theoreti-
cal background of the research is presented and the research 
methodology is described. In Part II the analysed CIs are intro-
duced as well as the summary of the finding regarding these 
particular CIs. Part III is a brief section where the hypotheses are 
evaluated and in Part IV contains some implications, reflections 
and lessons learned.
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2 Theory
A CI is a complex cooperation system. To estimate how success-
ful a CI may be in the future, we study the system and its part, 
the CA, as well. The link between whole and its part determines 
the future of the CI. If the CA forms the opinion that the CI 
helps its aims and the benefits of participation exceed costs 
and obligations, then this CA is interested in the survival and 
development of the CI. And conversely – if the CI does not offer 
better possibilities than those outside of it, the CA will not be 
interested in higher commitments. On the other hand we must 
also see if the CA is useful for the CI (or part thereof): if not, it 
must be left out, or it will become a deadhead.
In the following we describe the theoretical background of the 
study. We start with a brief introduction of the game theoretic 
concepts we use here then we describe how CIs work or should 
work according to the hypotheses outlined above. Our objec-
tive is to test these hypotheses, so the next parts describe the 
possibilities therefore and at last we present the actual research 
methodology that takes practical constraints into account, too.
2.1 Game theory
In this section we give a brief introduction to some concepts in 
game theory. It can safely be skipped for a general reading and 
only be used as a reference. For a more extensive discussion see 
(Gedai et al., 2012).
Game theory studies strategic conflict situations. What are the 
characteristics of these situations? Firstly, the parties are selfish: 
for a conflict of companies this simply means that they want to 
maximise profits although in general the utility of the conflict's 
outcome can manifest in various non-monetary forms, too. 
Secondly, the conflict's outcome depends on the parties' ac-
tions. We call the conflict situation a game and the involved 
parties the players. The name probably comes from the fact 
that the father of game theory, the Hungarian genius John von 
Neumann was originally interested in developing a mathemati-
cal theory of bluffing in poker and his mathematical results 
found applications in economics and beyond only years, dec-
ades later (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).
The strategy of a player determines his actions for every pos-
sible game scenario. As a result, given the strategies of the play-
ers, a game can be played and the outcome can be determined 
by a mediator or a computer. Therefore the payoffs, such as 
profits of the players can also be determined once the strategies 
are known. 
We can describe a game in various forms, but there is one dif-
ference that divides games into two groups: cooperative and 
non-cooperative games. The difference is in the legal environ-
ment: noncooperative games are played in the absence of a 
legal framework, in an environment where agreements are only 
kept if the parties are interested in keeping them. In coopera-
tive games, on the other hand we assume that it is possible 
to make binding agreements. Noncooperative games are best 
suited to study the detailed interaction of a few players, while 
cooperative game theory can handle the interaction of large 
groups of players. Before we move on to the theory let us con-
sider a simple story (from Gedai et al., 2012).
Company A has a brilliant idea that could be developed into 
a very successful and profitable idea – with the right partners. 
The CEO of A meets the CEO of B at a reception and over a 
crab sandwich they realise that they have some common inter-
ests: B could help company A to materialise this brilliant idea. 
For reasons that we do not need to go into here B's help is 
not enough, at least two companies of this type are needed. 
Fortunately B has contacts with C and D, either of which can 
serve as a second company, in fact A, C and D could also realise 
the project. The CEO of A finds the plan good and suggests to 
share the expected extra profit of 12 million to be shared equal-
ly among the four actors of this CI. Will this work? 
The shortest answer is: No. If the companies A, B and C can also 
do the project and obtain the same profit it would be foolish to 
include D in the project and pay it 3 million, wouldn't it? OK, 
D can stay on board, but with a much more modest share of 
the proceeds. Oh, but the same argument applies to B, or C 
that are of the same “type” of company as D. So, as a matter 
of fact A takes all and the substitutable members of the group 
get almost nothing. Moreover, even over the little payment they 
would get, they would start an eternal battle any two of these 
trying to skim the third company by kicking it out if the busi-
ness. 
We have only leaped over a tiny detail. A has no contact with 
C or D. A can only cooperate with these companies if B helps 
it, if B is on board, if you like: with B's permission. While com-
panies A, C and D could realise the project, such a cooperation 
is simply not possible. But then B has a new, special role: B can 
connect A with the right people. If we look at it again, there are 
only two ways the project could be realised: A, B and C or A, B 
and D. As C and D can substitute each other, they will not get 
much of the (extra) profit, the profit is shared between A and B. 
They can share the profit equally as 6-6 millions, but if any other 
distribution emerges neither of them will have the possibility 
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to increase its share. After the offer of company A, B getting 
9 millions is a likely outcome, for instance.
We have noted that C and D are perfect substitutes, in other 
words one of them is superfluous. So why did B suggest two 
partners at the first place? Consider the same setting when D 
is not there: Then only full cooperation of all the parties can 
realise the project. In such a setting B's role as intermediary is 
secondary, company C can rightly demand a share of the profit 
and this share is a loss to A and B. In other words A and B profit 
from having both C and D in the CI. 
Finally note that the assumption that a company will cooperate 
for zero profit might sound unrealistic. Of course this is zero 
economic, rather than accounting profit where the company 
has been compensated for all production costs as well as its 
opportunity cost (the cost of doing this project rather than in-
vesting its resources elsewhere) and a compensation for risk. 
Getting a zero profit is therefore not the same as not getting 
paid, but a higher profit is naturally preferred. In practice a zero 
profit case will not arise due to imperfect substitutes, capacity 
constraints or switching costs, but these only mildly affect our 
conclusions.
2.1.1 Non-cooperative games
A non-cooperative game consists of three elements: the play-
ers, their strategies and a utility function that gives the welfare 
of each player when some particular combination of strategies 
is chosen. We are interested in strategies that give the highest 
possible profit to each of the parties and are therefore stable. 
A particular combination of strategies is a Nash-equilibrium 
of a game, if the strategy chosen by any of the players is a 
best response to the strategy of the others assuming that their 
strategies are fixed. Conversely, a strategy combination is not a 
Nash-equilibrium if any of the actors could improve its welfare 
by simply switching to a different strategy.
In a CI cooperation can be seen as a public good, where the 
actors of the CI can choose an effort level to contribute to this 
project. While choosing a high effort would be better overall, 
the individual actors prefer to free-ride on others' efforts and 
spend own resources on own projects ultimately leading to the 
breakdown of the project and a dysfunctional CI. 
In real life we do see public goods realised, as self-enforcing 
mechanisms help to maintain cooperation: If the interaction 
lasts for more the one encounter the utility from a decision 
must also include the utility from future encounters. Mutual 
trust and mutual cooperation can be rewarded by future trust 
and cooperation. If the probability of future encounters is high 
and value of future money is high (the inflation is not too high), 
it is less likely that a one-time defection and the corresponding 
high payoff is greater than the value of future cooperation.
Note that this value of future cooperation is only there if the 
game is played repeatedly forever or at least is repeated with 
high probability. A cooperation with a definite or likely end 
does not help: in the last period the cooperation breaks down 
removing the incentives in the previous period to cooperate, 
and so on.
2.1.2 Cooperative games
The main difference between cooperative and non-cooperative 
games is that in cooperative games players can make agree-
ments they must keep and the interest is on the formation of 
coalitions and on the sharing of the benefits of cooperation 
rather than the means to achieve these. As shown in figure 1, 
in cooperative games strategies are limited to the choice of co-
operation. In this example the player makes a choice between 
the “red” and the “green” coalitions - or staying with the 
(“blue”) grand coalition.
We still have a set of players and this set is denoted by N. 
Groups of players are the coalitions. Actions, strategies are 
limited to choosing players for cooperation. Instead of a utility 
function for individual players, we have a value V for each coali-
tion. The characteristic value of the “red” coalition is classically 
defined as the minimal value obtained when playing against 
the complementer coalition, that is, the coalition of the remain-
ing players.
If we also make the assumption that members of a coalition can 
arbitrarily share this coalitional value then we talk about a game 
given in characteristic function form or simply a transferable 
utility (TU)-game.
?
Figure 1: Decision making in cooperative games 
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What is the solution of such a cooperative game? In purely 
cooperative games we assume that the grand coalition forms 
where all players cooperate and the solution only specifies how 
the players will distribute the value of the grand coalition. In 
some situations the question is more complex: which coalitions 
form, and how do the members share their values. There are 
much more ways to solve cooperative games, and perhaps the 
most popular concept is the core. 
The core (Gillies, 1959) is the cooperative equivalent of the 
Nash equilibrium, but it allows also for coalitional deviations 
(Figure 2). The core collects distributions of the total profit such 
that no coalition could get more on its own than how much its 
members receive in total from the original coalition. While it 
may seem rather difficult to satisfy the demands of all coalitions 
most games have many imputations that satisfy them. Unfor-
tunately there are also many that do not have any. We say that 
the core of such games is empty. To have an empty core means 
that the total resources available to the grand coalition are not 
sufficient to simultaneously satisfy all coalitional demands. 
2.1.3 Networks
Coalitions are a greatly simplified version of reality as they lack 
internal structure (Figure 6). In some situations the structure 
of cooperation has a role, too. Where personal connections or 
trust play a role only cooperation between parties that are con-
nected to each other personally or who trust each other are 
possible. In such situations a player can have a high value simply 
for connecting other, productive players (Borm, Owen, & Tijs, 
1992; Herings, van der Laan, & Talman, 2005). The core can 
also be generalised to games where the connections among the 
players are important. For such TU games over a network we 
must have a value function and know the underlying network 
of players.
Figure 3: The difference between feasible and infeasible coalitions
In network games only coalitions that are connected make 
sense (Figure 3a). A disconnected coalition (Figure 3b) means 
that some of players cannot communicate and therefore coor-
dinate. Such a coalition then clearly cannot form. 
2.2 Game theory in practice
Game theory is a theory based on ideas formulated in the 
minds of some mathematicians and economists who developed 
this field. Can it be used at all to study reality? 
For social sciences game theory is what Newton's Laws of Mo-
tion are for mechanics: a set of rules and mechanisms that de-
scribe the interactions of the various elements of the model. 
These rules may be imperfect, but over the last few decades 
game theory provided useful insights into an increasing num-
ber of problems ranging from market competition to university 
admissions. Its usefulness is confirmed by the large number of 
Nobel memorial prizes in economics granted to theoretical and 
applied game theorists in the last few years.
2.2.1 Issues: rationality, complexity
How to use game theory in practice? Are, for instance, players 
rational? Real life is more complicated than theory: Without 
perfect information players cannot exactly predict the strat-
egy choices of others, may not be able to precisely estimate 
the effect of their decisions not to mention the limitations of 
a model to fully capture reality: we will surely overlook impor-
tant aspects leading to imperfect models. At last we must note 
that evaluating complex games is costly and in the presence 
of simple rules of thumb that work reasonably well a detailed 
calculation leading to the best alternative is scrapped. 
Unfortunately, when there are more than 2 or 3 players model-
ling their interaction leads to games of astronomical complexity 
Figure 2: A coalition of players
b) Infeasible coalition
a) Feasible coalition b) Infeasible coalition
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and even if we have a well-defined game, computing the solu-
tion is difficult. And so far we have completely overlooked the 
issue whether actors also realise these strategies and solutions.
Defining a game is not the end of the story. Solving games 
is (often) a computationally difficult, a so-called NP-complete 
problem. This does not simply mean that finding the solution 
is difficult as in a difficult maths problem, but that the solution 
may be very easy, but it takes a very long time, or would need 
more memory than what we have in the universe. Chess, for 
instance, is a very simple game from a theoretical point of view, 
but the universe is too small for finding its solution. Note: this 
does not mean that there cannot be simple heuristics that help 
computers to do better than any human could. 
How can we then use game theory to study large CIs? We con-
sider two approaches (or a combination thereof). 
By sampling we reduce attention to a small subset of actors in 
the CI and for this small set we can have a precise definition of 
the game as well as a quantitative conclusion. By the model-
ling approach we give up studying the particular CI: instead 
we describe archetypal CIs, explore their characteristics and 
when looking at the actual initiative we merely test if either of 
these characteristics are present. By essentially linking CIs to 
these worked-out types we do not have to actually solve each 
game, but we can nevertheless apply general wisdom found 
for the archetype.
What are the main advantages and disadvantages of each of 
these approaches? Sampling effectively reduces the problem 
but only if the sample size is small. Here we really face a trade-
off: for precise estimation we would like to have a large sample, 
but as soon as we have over 10 or even 6 actors, their interac-
tion becomes difficult to model – this being the main limitation 
of this approach. The promise of quantitative outputs is nice, 
but picking 6-10 random points and restricting our attention 
to the interaction of these actors is extremely limiting, quite 
possibly they do not interact at all. 
This is clearly not a problem in the modelling approach, but 
here our responsibility is greater as the models must be descrip-
tive of CIs we find. There is of course always the possibility of 
returning to the desk and describing a new type if an atypical 
CI is found. 
In practice the two models are naturally combined since we 
cannot count on a 100% response rate from the actors. When 
sampling is used to identify the type of the CI, however, there is 
no problem with large samples, plus we need not ignore those 
outside of the sample. The results obtained here are often 
quali tative and both the results and the method of obtaining 
them is more understandable for non-technical audiences, such 
as the typical policy maker or participant in a CI.
This is not much different from the path usually taken in the 
study of market interactions by the field of Industrial Organi-
zation. Simple models, such as Cournot oligopoly predict how 
markets with certain number or concentration of firms will 
behave, what are the implications on prices, welfare or inno-
vation. Then regulators use concentration indices to evaluate 
proposed mergers – without necessarily going in depth of the 
actual proposal. 
The benefits of the modelling approach outweigh the disadvan-
tages so this is the approach taken. This suggests the follow-
ing research strategy followed in the sequel. First identify key 
aspects of CIs and identify relevant game theoretic models to 
understand these. Use the solutions of these games to explain 
possible patterns of behaviour as results of different strategies 
taken or perhaps due to different stages of development. De-
velop interviews to understand the rationale behind decisions 
taken by the actors, their goals and methods as well as the 
achieved results – which may be very different from what was 
intended. Using the theory, evaluate the results and possibly 
formulate suggestions to the managers of the CI. In the fol-
lowing first elaborate on the cluster models and identify types 
of CIs.
Pros Cons
Exact predictions Small sample size
Very partial, non-representative
Ignored interactions with others
Only drastic reductions work
Pro Cons
Communicable to 
non-technical/non- 
academic partners
Difficult to include soft 
inputs
Soft, but well-interpre-
table predictions
Never a perfect match for 
reality
Table 2: Features of the modelling approach, where a theoretical model is 
tailored to the empirical data
Table 1: Features of the sampling approach, where the evaluation is based 
on a small random sample of the actors
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2.3 Cluster actors
The novelty of our approach lies in the very simple idea to mod-
el CIs from the CAs' perspective. Only if and when the CAs find 
cluster participation profitable and more profitable than other 
opportunities will they be interested in actively cooperate in the 
CI. In this section we go over various aspects of participation of 
actors in CIs starting with very basic ideas, such as the rational-
ity of decision makers.
2.3.1 Rationality
Much of the work looking at the strategic interaction of firms as-
sumes that players act in a payoff-maximizing manner. In situa- 
tions where there is a conflict between the private and public 
interests this assumption may lead to some odd, unexpected 
or even paradoxical theoretical results. The Prisoner's dilemma 
is a popular example, where actors' selfishness leads to an un-
desirable outcome of the conflict, resulting in lower payoffs, 
while the Bertrand paradox is a well-known result where firms 
competing in prices with similar products and similar costs and 
no capacity constraints should get a 0 profit. 
Rationality has also been questioned by economic experiments 
where people have been observed to give up money to punish 
non-cooperative play and even take revenge on others. The lit-
erature often cites these examples as cases where the rational-
ity assumption fails; placing the situation into a bigger picture 
explains the decisions as parts of a longer term strategy. On the 
other hand the contradicting examples always contain humans, 
but here we deal with companies that are supposed to exhibit 
no emotions nor to have an agenda to teach moral lessons.
Rationality has two aspects and we intend to investigate both. 
First, rationality vis-a-vis irrationality: we investigate whether 
CAs make profit maximizing decisions or decisions that are dif-
ficult to support with economic arguments are also made. This 
aspect of rationality is generally assumed in game theory and if 
it is not satisfied game theory is not a very useful modelling tool. 
Secondly, rationality is vis-a-vis emotions or intuition. It is not 
enough if CAs make favourable decisions, but we want to 
know if these decisions are results of a conscious decision mak-
ing process or are merely lucky ad-hoc decisions. We do not 
want to downplay the importance of intuition in business in-
teractions, especially as some of these “intuitive” decisions are 
results of the same thorough analysis– in the mind of a business 
genius. This is to be distinguished of ad hoc decisions that lack 
the complex business planning and modelling and the strategic 
analysis of cooperation opportunities.
2.3.2 Profitability
As a direct implication of rationality a firm should only partici-
pate in a CI if this brings it additional benefit. The participation 
is a decision of the company only, so it is (almost) complete-
ly free to make this decision. This assumption is referred to in 
game theory as individual rationality. 
“The findings of the Cluster Impact Analysis provide informa-
tion to the cluster management showing whether companies 
derive benefit from networking activities and if so in which 
fields. Thus, the Cluster Impact Analysis aims at identifying the 
achieved effects that can be contributed to cluster and net-
working analysis.” (Kind & Meier zu Köcker, 2013)
“The present value of the awaited profit is being decreased not 
only by the time-factors but by risk of the distrust ... The more 
risk is recognised by the cooperating partners the less but im-
mediately provided advantage (profit) make them give up the 
cooperation.” (Gedai et al., 2012)
Why is a CA still sticking to a CI? The belief in the facts that it 
is worth doing it but is this belief based on established analyses 
or on the sixth sense of a leader? 
The result of each CA could be summarized as well as statically 
studied but the only one way to get the global picture is if the 
results are projected on the cluster-network.
Figure 4: The gains of participation in a CI and its value is influenced by different determinants
 benefits probability member ship 
cost
Gains of cluster 
 membership
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2.4 Cluster cooperation
Now we are going to study the future of the cooperation in the 
CI especially the impact of the objective and observable charac-
teristics influencing this future. This way the future expectations 
of the CAs and their impacts will be analyzed from the perspec-
tives of both the CAs and the CI itself. 
The evaluation of the CI, following the method of data col-
lection, will have three levels: intensity, structure and balance. 
Intensity is about the overall cooperation effort of the CI (Fig-
ure 5). Structure reveals the network of cooperation identifying 
the different roles of CAs and identifying key players. Balance 
is about the balance of power within the CI and the resulting 
tensions or conflicts of interest – if any.
In the following we elaborate these aspects in some detail.
 
Figure 5: Levels of evaluation for the CI
The gains of participation in a CI and its value (s. Figure 4) is influenced by …
… the benefit of the CI:
ff activity level of the CI
ff nature of the benefit (knowledge transfer, the advantage of manufacturing and developing,  
the supports etc.)
ff location in the production value chain and the competences of the CA (e.g the profits and motivations  
of distributors or pig-farming cooperatives are completely different in a prosciutto CI)
ff possibility of the self-supporting realization 
ff value of the partners: relevant competences and profit prospects from cooperation 
ff position within the network  
… the probability of the returns that depends on: 
ff past experience
ff returns horizon – the later, the riskier
ff trust level of partnerships
ff validation/force of agreement and understandings
ff position within the network
ff outside opportunities
… the costs related to participation in the CI 
ff actual costs, such as participation fees,
ff time commitment as cost
ff level of the knowledge transfer
ff forgone possibility of doing something else – opportunity cost
Intensity
Structure
Balance
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2.4.1 Intensity
This section is about the overall benefit the CI generates: both 
the potential and the efficiency to use that potential. 
While we see CIs as cooperation networks, the sheer mass of 
concentrated firms may bring benefits. While economies of 
scale may allow firms to operate more efficiently by sharing 
facilities, purchasing together or even by buying services, such 
as organising workshops that a single firm could not afford. 
Any sufficiently large group of firms could get such benefits, 
but CIs are networks of cooperation and so in the following 
we focus on the cooperation aspects of CIs. We have already 
talked about the public good nature of cooperation effort in a 
CI. By sharing information a CA creates benefits to others, but 
only gets the benefits that others have shared. There is a clear 
multiplication effect: the information provided by one is useful 
for many but giving up the privileged access to a piece of infor-
mation and sharing it with a potential competitor only pays off 
if the ‘sharing circle’ is large enough.
This is similar to the so-called stag hunt game (Figure 6): Two 
(or more) hunters have two choices: hunt a stag or rabbits. 
The two choices are mutually exclusive: either/or. The stag is a 
far more valuable prey, but requires the cooperation of several 
hunters. The rabbit requires no cooperation, but is less valued. 
This game has two equilibria: hunters may go for rabbits (the 
no-sharing noncooperative equilibrium), but there is a much 
better, cooperative equilibrium where they go for the stag. 
Clearly the latter is preferred as it gives a bigger profit to all par-
ties, but it is difficult to get cooperation when starting from a 
noncooperative status quo and cooperation more risky. A slight 
miscommunication will leave stag hunters with empty plates – 
the same cannot happen to rabbit-hunters.
The stag hunt in a CI corresponds to profitable multi-actor proj-
ects: participating firms must devote time and resources for the 
joint project – these cannot at the same time be used for private 
projects. The Table 3 displays a summary (technically: a projec-
tion) of such a game. Whether the chosen level of cooperation 
effort of an individual CA pays off depends on the decisions 
of other CAs. One would need a multi-dimensional table to 
include the strategic decisions of all the players, so here the 
decisions of other CAs are aggregated, the individual only sees 
(and cares about) the total number of other cooperating CAs. 
The joint project can only succeed with sufficient (total) effort 
requiring cooperation among firms. Since this game is nonco-
operative, firms can sign cooperation agreements, but it is very 
difficult to monitor if they are actually allocating their resources 
to this project. The joint project will only succeed in the pres-
ence of an elevated level of trust and coordinated cooperation, 
where many firms choose the public over the private projects, 
where these firms actually commit their resources and trust that 
others do the same and last but not least trust in long-term 
cooperation, believe that no or few firms will quit cooperation 
leaving many to participate. 
It is easy to see that a general belief in the success of the proj ect, 
that is, a scenario where already many are cooperating will at-
tract additional participants who prefer the increasingly certain 
higher profit. On the other hand, if the general understanding 
Many others make effort Few others make effort
CA chooses: CAs choosing… effort no effort effort no effort
effort
other CAs HIGH returns low returns LOST effort low returns
CA HIGH returns LOST effort
no effort
other CAs HIGH returns low returns LOST effort low returns
CA low returns low returns
Table 3: Cooperation game in the CI
Figure 6: Stag hunt game 
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is that the project may fail even those so far participating will 
quit. Creating the right atmosphere for cooperation is one of 
the – difficult – tasks of the management in the CI. 
Some collaborative projects require ‘opening up’ and sharing 
confidential information: creative or technological ideas or mar-
ket insights with other team members. An actor who cooper-
ates initially, but pulls out later may be able to use this informa-
tion to its private benefit. In such a setting a cooperation effort 
is a private good that is transformed into a public good, where 
some make – potentially – no contribution to it. Such situations 
create strong incentives for free-riding.
 
Real life interactions are richer, miscommunication is common. 
The signal whether other actors are making a cooperation 
effort or not is blurred, the uncertainty is greater. In a CI coop-
eration is more likely if the multiplicator effect works well and 
there are high rewards to cooperation. 
Table 4 describes an example a cooperation game with free rid-
ing. A reactive CA benefits from active CAs efforts, while saves 
own efforts to own projects. When all are reactive large scale 
projects (stags) cannot be realised. Active CAs benefit from the 
project, but have costs, too, overall giving them a profit of 5. 
When only some of the CAs work on the project, the effort 
are higher consuming all profits. Reactive players, on the other 
hand, benefit from the project without the associated effort, 
which is, instead spent on a private project (the “rabbit”) giving 
them a much higher payoff. When no-one works on the joint 
project, it is not realised so the much lower profits come from 
the private projects. The result is a typical prisoners' dilemma 
type game where individuals' selfish attitude destroys the much 
higher common benefit. While this game is artificial, games like 
this are considered simple, but accurate models of the general 
problem of voluntary provision of public goods.
It is interesting to note that already a small membership fee has 
a dramatic effect on the way this game is played. While without 
the membership fee (Table 5) we have a Prisoners' Dilemma, 
where free-riders are always better off on the short run and co-
operation is difficult to sustain, with membership fees CAs will 
prefer to quit the CI rather than playing this Nash equilibrium. 
The second table only differs in the subtraction of 2 as a mem-
bership fee for each actor. This membership fee is higher than 
the (additional) benefit in the private projects and therefore 
it is not worthwhile to be a CA and only do private projects. 
Leaving the CA is not indicated as a possible strategy, but this 
gives a payoff 0, which is still better than making a loss. Actors 
of noncooperative CIs will desert. The same happens to active 
members in the presence of free riders. Doing all the effort is 
still acceptable as long as the returns pay for the costs. The 
introduction of the membership fee pushes such benevolent 
firms in the red, too. In sum only clusters with cooperation may 
sustain and only if CAs have trust in long-term, cooperation. 
Free-riders may hit and run, but a CI can only survive if such 
moves are rare.
Intensity also looks at the CI at the aggregate level and esti-
mates the average significance of the CI for CAs. Theoretical 
models to detect (mathematical) clusters from network data are 
based on the assumption that links are more likely to form with-
in a cluster than between clusters (Copic, Jackson, & Kirman, 
2009). When studying a CI our position is different: here we 
already have the CI, but at the same time we also have data 
about network connections within and to some extent outside 
the CI. From these data we can calculate an intensity index that 
expresses the ability of the CI to intensify intra-cluster coopera-
tion.
The probability of forming links within the cluster is not only 
interesting when compared to the same probability between 
a CA and an outsider firm the actual probability values are in-
formative of how clustered the CI is.
Table 4: An example of a cooperation game with free riding
Table 5: The above example of a cooperation game with free riding 
 augmented with membership costs of 2.
Active CAs, key 
drivers; trust, 
cooperation
Reactive CAs, 
free riders;  
no trust, non- 
cooperation
Active CAs, key 
drivers; trust, 
cooperation
5, 5 0, 10
Reactive CAs, 
free riders; no 
trust, non-coop-
eration
10, 0 1, 1
Active CAs, key 
drivers; trust, 
cooperation
Reactive CAs, 
free riders;  
no trust, non- 
cooperation
Active CAs, key 
drivers; trust, 
cooperation
3, 3 -2, 8
Reactive CAs, 
free riders; no 
trust, non-coop-
eration
8, -2 -1, -1
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2.4.2 Structure
The second aspect we look at is the network of cooperation 
among actors in the CI. It would be very difficult to imagine a 
project or CI whose CAs do not have contact with each other, 
therefore we only consider connected projects, connected coa-
litions. The network of connections within (or outside) the CI 
therefore plays a key role on which projects may emerge. 
Figure 7: A cluster of firms without connections
The intensity index uses cooperation network data, but ignores 
the actual structure of cooperation within a CI. Studying the 
more important business relations within the CI, we draw two 
types of conclusions. Firstly, we can look for critical nodes and 
links within a network and study it from a vulnerability perspec-
tive (Shen, Nguyen, Xuan, & Thai, 2013). At the same time cen-
trality measures allow us to identify key (central) and peripheral 
actors of CIs – critical and key CAs are often the same, but need 
not be. Both types require special attention. Key CAs may have 
a dramatic influence on the CI, a too great of a reliance on such 
CAs makes the CI vulnerable to economic and management 
shocks. On the other hand CAs that are only connected to one 
or two other CAs risk to completely lose their link to other CAs 
if those few links become weaker: Peripheral CAs bring the risk 
of erosion. 
When obtaining detailed information on connections it already 
helps to identify problems or risks in a CI if we identify the gen-
eral characteristics of the network. While there could be many 
possible underlying structures for CIs, we consider four possible 
characteristic network structures and discuss their characteris-
tics: star, circle, snowflake and haystack. These structures differ 
in the number and position of key actors and have characteris-
tically different cooperation and growth possibilities. These dif-
ferences are elaborated in the following (s. Figure 8).
The “Star” network emerges when there is a very strong or 
very active leader in the CI. All CAs know the central player, but 
cooperation, projects are only possible via this central player. 
If the central player knows the other, peripheral players well, 
there is an explosive potential for forming cooperation as this 
player can act as an intermediary, and there is a very short path 
connecting two players. The benefits of such a coordinative 
CI are mostly related to its size: sheer size bring scale benefits 
in organising trainings, maintaining databases, gathering and 
sharing market information or act as a lobby group. On the 
other hand, in larger CIs being an intermediary may become a 
serious burden, it may adversely affect its ability to make own 
initiatives. The reliance on this central player is a serious risk for 
the CI on the long term. A young CI may have a star structure, 
but if no direct links are formed on the periphery, the central 
player is nothing, but a service provider and we can hardly talk 
about a cluster.
The “Circle” is just the opposite: there is no central player with 
all the advantages and disadvantages thereof. Without a leader 
CAs are likely to have only information about their connections 
and perhaps the connections of their connections, but form-
ing more extensive collaborations, such as connecting to firms 
across diagonals is difficult. A CI with a circle shape has a more 
limited growth potential and together with the lack of lead-
ership also limited options for renewal. Old CIs may have this 
structure; CAs should try to attract new partners to revitalize 
cooperation and get something like the next structure.
Figure 8: Characteristic network structures
Star Circle Snowflake Haystack
Theory 17
The “Snowflake” structure combines the advantages of the 
star and the circle. A snowflake has a densely connected core – 
a group of active firms who know each other very well. Moving 
out we see firms who are connected to some of the core firms, 
but are typically less well connected, while firms on the periph-
ery have even fewer connections, typically to more active firms. 
This is the structure of a CI with a natural inflow of new CAs – 
also an outflow of retiring CAs. While there is no central oracle 
who would be able to connect any two CAs, with the help of 
one or more central players the connections are easily made 
and there is a good potential to form new connections. With 
several key CAs the responsibilities are distributed and playing 
the role of an intermediary is less of a burden especially as CIs 
of such a shape have a natural tendency to develop a hierarchy 
where a key CA looks after a dendrite (‘arm’) of the snowflake. 
In such a case the departure of such a key CA may result in the 
disconnection of some of the CAs, but the whole CI is not in 
jeopardy.
The “Haystack” is a network without a real structure or a 
combination of the structures above. In a haystack there may 
be well connected local communities that, on the other hand, 
are hardly connected to each other. A haystack cluster, as a 
whole, is probably dysfunctional, with a continuous threat from 
densely connected subclusters to start their own life. A cluster 
in the reverse process: the merger of subclusters may exhibit a 
similar network pattern, although, if the merger is at their own 
initiative most likely the key players of the merging CIs are well 
connected eventually forming a larger snowflake.
The best way to distinguish between these models is by iden-
tifying the key actors of the CI. A star has a single key player 
(often the cluster management within CI), the circle has none, 
while the snowflake and the haystack structures have many. 
The latter can be distinguished by the connections between 
these key CAs: in a snowflake such connections are common, 
for the haystack they are not.
2.4.3 Balance
Given a network of cooperations and their position, CAs have 
different roles, duties and benefits, different influence on the 
CI. As an extreme case we have already looked at the central 
player in a star cluster – such an exceptional role is not com-
mon, but there may be players who have a higher involvement 
and influence in the CI. Their participation is critical for the CI, 
so we look at their case mainly.
During the study the key actors can be seen as the group 
of persons feeling really committed to the idea of the CI. 
Such key players typically have many connections and therefore 
much influence on CI decisions even if they do not formally 
have any decision power. So by key actors we mean those CAs 
who make decisions regarding the objectives and strategies of 
CI. 
Focussing on a sample of CAs we evaluate their expectations by 
themselves and within the CI, check if the in- and outputs into 
this relation are in balance. We strive for an evaluation of the 
entire web of cooperation and competition modelled by a co-
operative game, due to the limited data obtainable, the analysis 
will be limited to a qualitative application of a simplified version 
of the core (Kóczy, 2007). In practice this means that we must 
understand if CAs, especially key CAs benefit as much from the 
CI as much they put in and if there are subclusters who could 
do better without the rest.
While for the key players the threat comes from the overwhelm-
ing choice for cooperation, for peripheral players the problem 
is the lack thereof. A peripheral CA may think that the limited 
cooperation it has within the CI would still exist without the 
cluster participation. If such players experience difficulties to 
develop new links or to integrate better into the CI the periph-
ery that is to be seen as a chance for renewal in the CI erodes 
and the CI may become an aged circle. 
At last players in the middle will have many connections form-
ing many projects, but many of these go via some of the key 
CAs potentially creating an imbalance regarding working effort 
or profit distribution, which players in the middle may consider 
unfair. While a similar imbalance may exist towards peripheral 
players where middle players have a critical role, but the per-
ception of unfair allocation can poison cooperation.
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3 Research methodology
In the following we outline how the information required for our analysis could be obtained (s. Figure 9).
3.1 Fundamentals of decision 
 making
In order to increase efficiency and impact of the cluster ap-
proach, we must, first of all, understand if the CAs make deci-
sions along the rationality principles generally assumed in theo-
retical models. How are these decisions made? Consciously or 
intuitively? Answering these questions requires a detailed in-
sight into the decision mechanisms of CAs as well as the organ-
isation and code of the CI. 
3.2 Profitability
While the above mentioned questionnaires help us to gain 
general information about decision making in CIs, the second 
group of data to measure the profitability is CI-specific. Ideally 
we propose to have a figure for the entire CI and all its subclus-
ters that describe their profitability. This is an enormous amount 
of information that are not only sensitive data, but most likely 
this information is not at all available. In practice we cannot 
have and do not need all data; but CAs are able to identify 
valuable cooperations, if any. 
In other words, we do not need to conduct extensive econom-
ic analyses for all the (exponential number of) subclusters, but 
only consider the valuable ones, as seen by the firms.
3.3 Network structure
At last, for an analysis that takes the social or economic net-
work within the CI into account, we must have information 
about partnerships among CAs. We see three ways to gather 
such data. Firstly, when trying to obtain the value of subclus-
ters, their CAs might simply respond that they do not know 
these people and therefore cannot give an estimate of the value 
or profitability of that CI. In practice, however, it is unlikely that 
such detailed information is available; the value of CIs must be 
estimated in some other way, which takes us to the other two 
options. 
A well-managed CI is likely to have detailed and well docu-
mented information about past instances of cooperation as 
well as past business transactions. It may also have information 
on how the various CAs got involved, perhaps via other CAs. 
This is “hard” information on business relations and is informa-
tive not only about the existence of economic links, but also the 
intensity of these links. 
At last, one may resort to questionnaires and interviews asking 
about business partners, although such “soft” information is 
more likely to be imprecise and incomplete and firms are likely 
to be reluctant to share such valuable information.
The cluster as 
a cooperation 
environment
The cluster
Network 
structure
Commitment 
level
 f Data analysis 
 f Opportunities and 
risks for the cluster's 
future
The  
rationality
factor
Cluster actors
expectations
Figure 9: Research methodology
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3.4 Methodology of cluster  
 analysis
In our analysis we evaluate the CI as a cooperation environment. 
We identify the fields of cooperation, the valuable competences 
as well as the successful cooperation experiences the CI has 
accumulated. We collect information about the rules used for 
cooperation and for the internal and external decisions of the 
CI. The success management of the CA will be studied as well. 
Research questions
1)  What are the costs of participation in a CI?
2)  Do firms make economically rational decisions when 
joining a CI?
3)  What is the objective of the CI? Is cooperation a participa-
tion objective?
4)  What is the structure of cooperation?
5)  Do members invest into cooperation?
6)  What are the CAs' perceived roles within the CI? Who are 
the key actors? 
7)  What are the risks CAs accept in exchange of the (profita-
ble) operation of the CI or the hope thereof?
8)  Are CAs ready to share? 
9)  Do CAs see CI participation as a conflict situation and to 
what extent?
10)  What are the internal/external threats of cooperation? Is 
joining another cooperation a feasible alternative?
11)  Are competences balanced within the CI? 
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4 Practical Part
4.1 The stages of our investigation
The CI has been met on three types of occasions. At the begin-
ning, the goals of these meetings have been elaborated as well 
as how these meetings are organised.
4.1.1 Workshop
Our contact with a CI begun with a workshop with the CM and 
the CAs to explain out the motivation for our project, a brief 
introduction to our models and a description of the foreseeable 
results of our investigation including the potential benefits for 
the CI and the CAs. 
Here we have already talked about the main line of the ques-
tionnaire that will be used during the interviews. 
4.1.2 Interview with the CM
Following the workshop we interview the CM and the chair of 
the CI. On the one hand the CM can provide us with general 
information about the CI, but also specific information about 
CAs. Many of the questions we hope to get answers from the 
manager we ask the CAs: whether the views of the manager 
and the CAs agree say a lot about their relation. 
We ask the manager to identify key players in the CI, explain 
how these firms are related to each other (business, or per-
sonal connections) and how the remaining CAs connect to 
these CAs. The shape of the emerging graph is very informative 
about the robustness of the CI. We use network analysis tools 
to evaluate the network properties.
For larger CIs the manager may be unable to provide informa-
tion on each of the possible relations. (For instance, with 10 key 
and 100 other players we ask about 10x9/2=45 key and some 
1000 satellite relations.) By using an “I do not know” option 
the manager reveals that he does not know/care about these 
CAs. We expect the loosely connected CAs' share to increase 
with CI size. 
Obviously such “superfluous” CAs do not have much influence 
for the success of a CI, so to a great extent they can be ignored 
(although it would be interesting to understand their motiva-
tions for joining the CI).
The managers' questionnaire is presented in Appendix A.
4.1.3 Interview with the CAs
As a typical CI will have dozens of CAs, it is usually impossible 
to personally interview all. Instead a sample is chosen based 
partly on the managers' advice and on a preliminary question-
naire sent out after the workshop to ensure that we talk to all 
types of CAs.
When making the interviews with the CAs we try to talk to the 
decision makers rather than the cluster delegates in case the 
two are different. Our interviews have a formal protocol follow-
ing a script, but can be adjusted to have a natural conversation. 
We try to have the interviews personally or over Skype: on the 
one hand seeing us helps to build trust. If the interviewed per-
sons trust us we hope to get more genuine answers. On the 
other hand by seeing them giving the answers we can follow 
their body language and detect hesitation that is perhaps not 
present in words. Indeed our main concern is that firms will try 
to make reality nicer than it really is by giving biased answers. 
For instance, when asked, whether they make sensible, eco-
nomically well-founded decision mechanisms firms would be 
inclined to say yes even if this is not the case just to draw a 
better image of themselves. 
To explore the internal structure of the CI discovering the bi- 
and multilateral businesses and actions within the CI we ask 
questions such as
ff Which CAs do you consider important business partners?
ff Which CAs do you consider valuable business partners?
ff Which CAs do you consider important potential business 
partners?
Based on the answers of the CAs we can establish a coopera-
tion network. We will research the internal interest-system of 
the CAs and we will analyze it in connection with the whole 
network.
4.1.4 Analysis
After the answers to the questionnaires and interviews have 
been collected we evaluate them according to the points dis-
cussed in the theoretical part: We look at the individuals' per-
spectives and then the effect of individual interests on the CI 
level cooperation. Where possible we draw the cooperation 
network – as long as not all CAs have been interviewed, these 
networks are merely to identify the typology of the initia-
tive-wide cooperation.
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5 The analysed CIs – a comparison 
We have conducted dozens of interviews with CAs of two CIs 
with proven management excellence, which are introduced in 
the next subsections. The interviews were sufficient to have a 
broad understanding of the CIs at hand – unfortunately data 
from two CIs are insufficient to form general conclusions, 
which we try to do anyway. Information from two CIs may not 
be sufficient to identify general patterns, but enough to pin-
point false theories. 
We believe that our analysis of the two CIs at hand had the 
potential to provide useful feedback to the managers. Unfor-
tunately the response rate was a little lower than expected, 
especially in the CI where we did not have the opportunity to 
start with a workshop or send out preliminary questionnaires. 
Overall the interviewees were friendly, but clearly did not see 
our work more interesting than any other form for statistics for 
the government. 
While the response rate was a little lower than anticipated 
we were taken aback by the frankness and sincerity of the re-
spondents especially where the interviews were held in person. 
Perhaps this would change if we would only have an electron-
ic questionnaire and no interviews although it was clear that 
some respondents wanted to waste no time during the inter-
view and telling the truth is often the simplest. Interestingly 
other interview lasted much longer than planned – we see this 
as a sign for a sincere interest in the cluster cooperation.
The latter was confirmed by the fact that almost all respond-
ents found being a CA a good thing and firms were very happy 
about the CM. 
In the following we present the two CIs we have analysed. 
Note: the analysis below is based on limited responses from 
only part of the CAs in each of the CIs. The answers are, by no 
means representative and therefore cannot be used to evaluate 
or judge the particular CIs at hand. On the other hand, while 
the answers are not representative in a statistical sense, they 
contained a good mixture of both active and passive, large and 
small CAs, making the respondents a good test group never-
theless. 
CI A CI B
Sector Lifestyle IT
Age 12 years 8 years
Participation type Letter of intent Membership
Number of CAs 389 45
Share of SMEs 89% 96%
Share of firms with less than 
50- employees
76% 95%
Origins
Professional management  
attracting relevant firms
Past business and personal relations
Growth
Calls for participation in  
workshops & trainings
Via business and personal relations
Cooperation focus Breadth Depth
Table 6: The main characteristics of the studied CIs
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5.1 Clusterinitiative A
One of the CIs we have studied is a lifestyle CI of some 389 
firms based on the existing cooperation of firms in the textile 
and furniture industries. Additional firms joined after partici-
pation in one of the many activities: trainings, workshops or-
ganised by the management with profiles ranging from design 
to architecture. There is no cluster membership - also no mem-
bership fee, - the firms participating at events are the actors. 
There are also no CI meetings or CI code as such, CAs meet at 
the aforementioned events. In the absence of cluster events we 
could not organise an introductory workshop, contact with the 
CI started with an interview with the CM. The information pro-
vided there was – we understand – passed on to (some) CAs. 
The CM gave us a list of CAs with a classification based on their 
activity level and we selected interviewees so that we can talk 
to different types of members, overall we had 19 interviews.
Rationality and profitability
Many CAs found the programmes organised by the manage-
ment tremendously useful. Since there is no membership fee, it 
is clearly a good deal. 
On the other hand participation costs do not only include mem-
bership fees, but also the costs and time committed to cluster 
activities. Taking these into account three respondents reported 
costs – including actual and time/opportunity costs – around 
€1000 for his participation in a single workshop. This respon-
dent was positive about the workshop, but admitted that his 
costs exceeded the benefits.
Intensity
The CI includes some of the larger, international companies 
active in the lifestyle sector as well as small and even micro 
enterprises. Interestingly, the CI also includes for instance con-
sulting firms and others outside the main profile. There firms 
gave rather different answers referring to the CI as a business 
opportunity and described their participation as contracted by 
CAs and/or the management. Apart from such firms CAs could 
not mention cooperation that did not exist prior to the CI or 
that was due to the CI. With these in mind we conclude that 
the peer-to-peer cooperation intensity of the CI is very low cur-
rently, but we see good growth opportunities once we look at 
the structure of cooperation.
Structure
We have asked CAs of CI A to choose the stylised structure of 
their structure. Most have chosen the snowflake and indicated 
that they are on the periphery. 
We have also asked them to list the key CAs as well as the CAs 
they cooperate or plan to cooperate with. A significant part 
mentioned the management as the key player, most of them 
as the only key player (s. Fig. 10). Very few CAs (mostly con-
sultants) could at all name another CA. The structure is there-
fore more likely a star, where very few peer-to-peer connections 
have been made yet and most cooperation is managed at the 
centre of the star. Figure 10 is not an ideal star since many in-
terviewees did not consider the CM as a core partner (although, 
in fact, it is).
Balance
Here participation – attending workshops, etc. – comes with no 
strings attached. CAs are not committed at all, some were even 
a bit confused when asked about their cluster activites as they 
are involved in various programmes. The low response rate also 
confirms this.
On the other hand competition is not with ties here, but with 
the quality of events and the management of CI A has im-
pressed its actors a great deal. 
Summary
CI A has its programmes supported by regional, national or 
European sources: CAs recall some activity organised by the 
“government”, but do not remember that this was a cluster 
event. CAs enjoy the services of the management, benefit from 
the managed cooperation effort, but take these for granted. 
In our view the CI is still very young. It has been able to attract 
much interest with its various programmes, but has not built 
a brand yet. In a sense the sandwiches have already attracted 
many people to the party, so let's start dancing. So far we do 
Figure 10: Cooperation map of CI A. The cluster management is denoted 
by a larger dot.
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not see actions that would support networking, but with such 
a large pool to start with the chances for peer-to-peer connec-
tions are good.
5.2 Clusterinitiative B
CI B is active in the IT sector and has 45 CAs, all SMEs, of which 
16 have been interviewed (Figure 11). The cluster was set up 
at the initiative of one of the owners inviting firms with similar 
profiles usually via a personal contact to participate. Since then 
many other firms have joined, but a similar number has been 
turned down due to the lack of relevant competences. Now let 
us evaluate the results in the same structure as our theoretical 
model has been built.
Rationality and profitability
We must discuss these two aspects affecting the individual CAs 
together. The reason is that, while the CI has benefited from 
funding in the past, currently the management and all the ac-
tivities are financed from membership fees. Currently all CAs 
agree that their expected profit from participation exceed the 
membership fees by far so any formal cost-benefit analysis is 
superfluous. One of the smaller companies, noted that a three 
times higher fee would make serious calculations necessary.
Intensity
As the CAs are all relatively small companies and the IT profile 
makes cooperation with companies of very different profiles 
possible, the CI occupies a small, but noticeable part of their 
activities. On the other hand most CAs see the CI as a brand 
and CAs meet regularly making the CI more important in the 
life of these firms than its market weight would suggest. 
On the other hand larger CAs also commit time to other similar 
organisations – not yet CIs, where an even more intense co-
operation is observed. These outside options appear attractive 
due to their geographical proximity and may pose the (remote) 
threat of departure for a key CA.
Structure 
The CI has a closed membership, each CA is approved by a 
steering committee. In turn CAs know each other very well; 
most can name at least a third of the CAs, many more than half 
(an average of 9.2 cooperating partners mentioned, although 
the variance is high – the corrected sample standard deviation 
is 6.6), but certainly the firms in the steering committee (71% 
named at least 3 of the top 5 CAs as key actors, Figure 13). 
With several key players who know each other well, the co-
operation structure of the CI has that shape of a snowflake 
(Figure 12). Starting originally from a star structure it has been 
very successful in getting a ring of key players involved more 
actively in building connections between these key players – 
connections that go well beyond the administrative duties in 
the steering committee, but involving players on the periphery 
often remains a challenge. It is also true that the original central 
player – currently the chair of the CI – is still ‘more equal than 
others’. In current discussions this CA wants to reduce the CI's 
reliance on it in the near future.
Note that in this structure there is no clear centre: the manage-
ment is not even on the map. Managed cooperation is there-
fore very rare.
Due to current CI accreditation rules the CI is a bit locked-in 
with its membership: while they would be happy to grow they 
Figure 11: CAs' and respondents' size-distribution by the number of employees in CI B
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must follow a very conservative growth model and only take 
in firms they are absolutely sure about. A failed attempts for 
cooperation with an entry followed by an exit soon after can 
easily lead to losing their accreditation.
Balance
This CI focussed on deeper, rather than wider cooperation. 
With only a handful, though committed CAs the multiplica-
tor effect does not always work, the public good created by 
the input efforts is only to the benefit of a limited number of 
firm. Also, financing the CM is a substantial burden. In sum, 
participation is costly, net benefits are meagre and this carries 
the inherent risk of reducing cooperation effort or defecting to 
another CI or a similar organisation. The high effort of some of 
the key players makes partly up for this, but one wonders how 
are they rewarded for such efforts.
Internally still many of the CI projects go via the former cen-
tral player creating occasional distributional tensions, but these 
seem to be secondary compared to the gains from the projects. 
Summary
This CI is coming of age with the initiator gradually retreating 
turning a star into a snowflake structure. The CI exhibits some 
genuine examples of cooperation within the CI. Conserva-
tive participation rules inhibit growth, introducing affiliate- or 
pre-membership status could overcome these difficulties. 
5.3 A comparison
We have been fortunate enough to study two CIs with differ-
ent backgrounds. CI B builds on past business and personal 
relations and tries to expand along the same lines. CI A has 
a professional management organising government-funded 
workshops and trainings that attract many participants. CI B 
is small with regular events where many CAs participate. As a 
result CAs know each other well and the goal is to form many 
CA-to-CA cooperations with the management helping from 
the background. CI A has few CA-to-CA cooperations (or at 
least CAs are not aware of these ) as CAs' participation is often 
not more than attending a once off event or training – one re-
spondent doubted if this can really be called a CI. On the other 
hand the management of CI A has much information about the 
CAs and with such a broad base conscious matchmaking can 
explode the number of CA-to-CA connections. Such growth 
is more difficult for CI B where CAs already know each other 
well and inviting new CAs may be the key for revitalising the 
CI. However, both CIs gain high CAs satisfaction and proved 
sygnificant added value.
Figure 12: Cooperation map of CI B based on 16 responses. The size of 
nodes indicates how many CAs labelled the corresponding firm important 
for the CI
Figure 13: Frequency of top 5 key CAs mentioned as a percentage of respondents in CI B
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6 Results
6.1 The assessment of the validity  
 of the previous hypotheses
In the previous study, a set of hypotheses have been defined 
which were tested in this study. In the following the validity of 
these previously defined hypotheses.
The bases of decision making: Do actors like profit?
1. Companies join CIs as a ‘homo oeconomicus’, with the 
intention to harvest profits that could not be harvested 
otherwise. Other factors, such as the joy of creativity and 
collaboration facilitates this co-operation play but an aux-
iliary role and can also be expressed in financial terms.
 ü While profitability is not always formally tested, among 
the reasons for joining CIs all respondents listed aspects 
that increase profits.
2. Companies take conscious decisions when joining CIs and 
this decision is just as formal as the decisions when joining 
any other co-operation.
 ü Participation clearly depends on the costs and benefits. 
ff CAs reported benefits that exceed the costs by far 
making a formal analysis superfluous. 
ff It was also mentioned that a drastic increase in costs 
would make a more formal analysis necessary.
ff Higher mandatory investments lower the share of 
passive actors and free riders
ff High public funding creates an overdemand of CM 
services inviting CAs with unclear ideas and generally 
lower readiness to contribute. In the CI with member-
ship fees (CIB) trust in other cluster members is much 
higher (80% vs. 33%).
3. Companies do a cost-benefit analysis comparing the cost 
of sharing confidential information with other CAs and 
the foreseeable benefits from the projects.
 û 95% of all respondents did not make a cost-benefit 
analysis.
ff The prevailing reason is that no considerable long-term 
(financial) commitments are required. 
ff With high investments (e. g. annual membership fees) 
candidates are more reluctant, but as yet no such 
analy ses are made, even for long-term CAs
ff Firms do not consider sharing information a cost, the 
main costs of participation are membership fees (in 
CI B) and time commitment.
4. CAs attach value to projects in the CI that are not yet 
realised.
 ü Yes, 55 % of respondents in CI B mentioned participation 
as an investment into yet unrealised benefits. Participa-
tion benefits, however, include many other things, such 
as trainings, sharing information and other knowledge. 
Especially in CI A these are the major benefits.
5. The value of a CI for a particular company is the discount-
ed money-stream within a given time horizon with a 
discounting reflecting the depreciation of the currency 
as well as the probability that the project or stream of 
projects will be discontinued.
 û No, such calculations are never made.
 
Figure 14: Responses to the question: Who would you share sensitive information with for potential benefits? Check all that apply. Answers to Q 22
Our company pre-screens all its partners.
We only trust firms we personally know.
Actors of the cluster are more trustworthy.
We feel no discomfort sharing our information
We generally trust firms, cluster membership 
has nothing to do with this
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Cluster code – structure: views on present and future 
 alternatives
6. The cluster code addresses alternative outcomes.
 û Cluster codes have the intention to rule the distribution 
of the profits and benefits among CAs on the cluster level 
rather than on an individual project base. 
None of the CIs involved had such a code neither there was 
any consciousness of the very most CAs that such code 
might be needed.
7. The cluster code regulates undesirable, but possible 
scenarios, such as conflict situations, too.
 ? If the circumstances are calculable, the actors do not 
pay attention to it. The actors of CI B are aware of the 
threat of secession and are considering steps to minimise 
the risk, but there seems to be no best practise in this 
field. In CI A there is no general cluster code, but formal 
model agreements tailored to each managed cooperation 
project. 
Joining a CI: Do actors look for profit?
8. A company only joins a CI if this brings additional 
 benefits.
 ü Yes, this is the driving force for participation, although 
what the “additional benefits“ may be is often unclear. 
CAs join if their expectations are positive and they will be 
more or less fulfilled. Only 3 % of respondents reported 
participation where costs exceeded expected benefits.
9. If a company has the possibility to join one of two CIs the 
company will join the one that results in higher payoffs.
 ü CAs are continuously looking for a new and better op-
portunities. Interviews have shown that firms are open to 
move from one CI to another if this offers better profits. 
In CI B are considering to shift their focus on other in-
dustrial groups, in CI A some firms already participated in 
multiple – loose - partnerships. 
10. A company should join the most profitable of all available 
CIs. 
 ü Yes, they are considering other alternatives, but choice 
may be limited. On the other hand the lack of transfer 
mechanisms within CIs means that a CI may be ideal for 
one CA, but less good for others and vice versa for an-
other CI. The decision ultimately depends on 
ff Choices of available CIs to join.
ff The allocation mechanisms in the potential CIs.
ff The certainty of expected profits. 
10.1. A company should leave the CI if a more attractive part-
icipation offer becomes available in another CI.
 ü Yes, the companies permanently weigh it up. Participa-
tion is not exclusive. 
10.2. A company only joins a CI if none of the subclusters 
offer better prospects.
 ü At CI A there is no competition for the sources, the ben-
efits of cluster participation are not dependant on the 
presence of other CAs, but CI B is not ready to accept 
each and every application of new companies. Using 
the terminology of subclusters introduced earlier we can 
interpret a rejection decision as a subcluster “departing“ 
from a (potential) larger CI. This is possible if the original 
CAs would not benefit from, or even would be harmed 
by the arrival of new actors.  
How to keep all CAs happy at the same time?
11. The cluster code ensures that the gain of any subcluster 
exceeds its profit as an independent cluster. 
 ü In general the risk of secession CI breaking up into smaller 
CIs is low because there is no exit mechanism and there is 
no fractioning within the CI, but in CI B the management 
is considering new mechanisms to increase the gain for 
companies with a risk to secede. 
Social networks: How do projects form?
12. A (sub) cluster must be connected: Any other actor must 
be a friend's friend's friend.
 ü Knowing someone personally is as the key of trust has 
been highlighted by many (39 % / 40 % of respondents, 
see Figure 14). 
6.2 Determinants for CI  
 development
Based on the previous findings a set of determinants will be 
discussed, which might have a strong influence on the develop-
ment of a cluster or cluster initiative. 
High public funding may have adverse effects
Both CIs A and B have benefited from public funding in the be-
ginning, CI A still finances its activities from such a public grant. 
Grants are very useful in setting up a CI and organise events 
that make the CI valuable for new CAs. These are the ‘sand-
wiches’ in our party example or a free rabbit for deer hunters 
in the stag hunt game. Unfortunately, one can very easily get 
used to such freebies and at a point stag hunters may just enjoy 
the free rabbit and forget that their original intent was to go 
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after the stag (s. Figure 15). In CI A we felt that the free actions 
distract the attention from the original idea of a CI. 
In CI B, where public funding is sparse and unreliable the man-
agement spends much effort in raising funds to cover its opera-
tion that is clearly wasteful from their point of view. At last we 
noted that firms try to get more out of a project they had to pay 
more for: a (high) membership fee makes CAs want to spend 
time with the CI. As shown in Table 5, introducing a member-
ship fee makes participation less attractive for free riders. In CI 
A, the 16 respondents mentioned 40 out of the total 45 CAs as 
actual or expected cooperation partners, so at most 5 CAs are 
unattractive cooperation partners.
It is also interesting to compare the self-reported activity level of 
CAs. In the figure above one can clearly see that the proportion 
of passive members is 47 % vs. 20 % in favour of the CI with 
membership fees. While our figures are based on a biased sam-
ple, likely those are the more active CAs who responded and all 
the respondents of CI A have been classified as active or even 
proactive by the CM. 
Cluster management must understand CAs' interests
The level of participation varies greatly within the studied CIs. 
When interviewed some had to be practically informed that 
they are CAs, while others literally called themselves part of 
the management. Cluster participation has a very simple rule of 
thumb: the more you put in the more you get. For those CAs 
who are taking an active role in the CI, the requested cluster 
services are richer, for the less active ones the costs of partici-
pation are the greater concern. Costs may be both time and 
money, and especially in the self-funded CI B, where activities 
are funded from membership fees different CAs find different 
trade-offs attractive between costs and services. 
CAs' participation can be classified into a 4-layered “onion” 
structure with proactive, active, reactive and passive CAs (s. Fig-
ure 16). 
ff Proactive CAs are the key actors in the CI leading it with 
own initiatives. They are self-motivated. They are the pearls 
in the CI.
ff Active CAs may not take on a leading role, but are often 
partners in these initiatives. As cooperative actors they may 
be the ‘hidden champions’.
ff Reactive CAs are on the look for opportunities and when 
a project addresses them, they are likely to join. Can be 
transformed from non-cooperative to cooperative actors. 
The ‘sleeping giants’.
ff Passive CAs do not even react to such initiatives: either they 
are too picky about projects, are newcomers or are about 
to “fall off“ as the outer layers of an onion.
Figure 16: The different layers of participation
Figure 15: Responses to question: Which of the following describes your level of involvement in the CI?
proactive CAs taking own 
initiatives
active CAs supporting 
 cooperation
reactive CAs receptive to 
others' initiatives
passive CAs irresponsive to 
initiatives
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Interestingly, managers are not always well-informed about 
CAs' participation. In CI A many of the respondents declared a 
lower participation level than indicated by the manager, while 
none claimed higher. This may be an error of judgement by the 
manager or simple modesty of the respondents, but the apolo-
getic tone they often used in giving the answers suggests that 
these CAs see additional potential in participation.
While a higher level of participation is generally better, a suc-
cessful CI is unlikely to have only core CAs! There must be ways 
to gradually involve newcomers as well as professional proto-
cols to leave the CI. Newcomers bring new cooperation pos-
sibilities increasing the scale and scope of the CI. Newcomers 
are most likely “brought in” by a CI event or by one of the CAs. 
Initially their activity is low and will count as passive/reactive 
members. The absence of such members is often an indicator 
that they are missing. It is difficult to pinpoint ideal figures, but 
the ratio of passive members in CI A is a little too high (47%) – 
the CM should find ways to get them involved, - while in CI B 
the renewal mechanisms are imperfect so the ratio of passive 
members is probably a little too low (20%). This suggests that 
the figure could be 25%-40% of CAs (see also Figure 15). The 
role of peripheral CAs is discussed further in Section 0.
The structure of the CI
The network of existing connections has much influence on link 
formation. In a star network the central player is instrumen-
tal in forming projects and thereby helping others to connect. 
In a snowflake this duty is shared. The same holds for a circle 
network, but there there may be no coordination between the 
key players. Clearly, CAs at such key positions have a conflict 
of interest in helping others to connect as this weakens their 
positions: they may be left out of projects they were needed for. 
On the other hand they will also benefit from the more exten-
sive cooperation of others are partners. Managers do not have 
this conflict, but it is not clear what would be their incentive to 
enhance peer-to-peer cooperation.
Entry and exit
New CAs bring new prospects for cooperation, but at the same 
time upset the business as usual of the CI. There is a clear con-
flict between scale and scope: a more focussed, more special-
ised CI will naturally consist of fewer CAs, in a CI with too many 
CAs, the focus is lost, the events may become too general or 
interest only a small part of the CAs. There is no golden rule 
but facilitating entry and exit helps the renewal of participants 
and regularly brings the potential of new connections. CAs with 
many working relations do not leave the CI, so an easier exit is 
also a cleaning process. 
New entrants bring the long-term prospect of new partnerships, 
but they also enter the circle of trust of the CI as outsiders. It 
is not only the new entrant, who has to make a cost-benefit 
analy sis whether to enter the CI, but also the CI allows a new 
CA into its private sphere. A structure such as the snowflake 
makes a gradual entry possible, very natural.
The stakes for participation
We have already compared cluster participation to a stag hunt 
game, where the gains from cooperation exceed the profits 
without it. This cooperation is, however, risky as its success de-
pends on the participation of other CAs – something we have 
no control of at all. While we cannot guarantee everyone's 
participation cooperation is more attractive if the benefits are 
higher: in this case the expected benefit from the (risky) stag 
hunt goes up, while the benefits of the rabbit do not change. 
Then the stag hunt becomes more attractive making it more 
likely that CAs choose a high level of participation. This, in turn, 
further increases the value of participation so a chain reaction 
starts. Igniting the process is more difficult, but patient CAs, 
who, realising the process, are willing to lend high level partic-
ipation in the hope of high returns, or a risk-neutral investor, 
such as a government can intervene at that point.
The role of the sub-clusters
When the stag-hunt does not require full cooperation and a 
smaller group can get the same prey, the prospect of having to 
share it with unnecessary CAs may make this group consider 
severing cooperation with these CAs. Ex ante, that is, before 
the projects are realised there seems to be no reason for as-
suming that additional CAs bring no benefit, but ex post, when 
a particular project shapes up, and we do not only theoretise 
about profits, but these are about to be realised there may be 
CAs who are suddenly superfluous. 
We found little evidence of such destabilising groups in CI A, 
which is hardly surprising. In CI B there are some denser areas in 
the network where such conflicts may arise in the future.
Size
When the number of participating firms is high the fixed costs 
of organising a workshop or a training divide making things 
that would be too expensive for a single firm or even a small 
CI affordable. Such benefits would be available for any group 
of firms. While we do not want to downplay the importance of 
such savings, the added value of CIs is cooperation, so in the 
following we look at size from a cooperation point of view. 
There is a trade-off between size and search costs. In large CIs 
there is a large selection of potential partners, so there is no 
need to start bonding at the first chance: quite possibly there 
will be better matches. On the other hand, good cooperation 
is built on a high level of trust, that is developed over several 
encounters and in a large CI the number of encounters with a 
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particular firm are too few. Among the many companies one 
meets at meetings it is difficult to remember a single one – this 
is at least the experience from CI A.
When few firms are “locked up” in a small CI trust develops 
much more easily and joint projects emerge more often de-
spite the smaller choice of perfect partners. The difference was 
striking at our question regarding the ideal team (question 21) 
very few (10%) of the large CI could actually name multiple 
partners, one respondent explicitly mentioned contacting the 
CM for advice. CAs of CI B had no problem thinking up a good 
team, since, with one exception they already have such co-
operation partners
A good manager can work magic in a large CI by an appropri-
ate “matching service”, in a small CI it is easy to reach a dead 
end.
Focus
An CI is of course a concentration of firms working in similar 
industries. On the other hand it is often a little difficult to draw 
firm lines and there may be reasons to include firms with more 
remote profiles and competences. CI B has been a bit more 
closed in the past, but is now slowly opening up for new ideas. 
Clearly, for them this brings in new CAs, although some are 
sceptical about cooperation among firms with such different 
profiles. 
On the other hand, in CI A we have received some rather sur-
prising suggestions. A design firm suggested that they would 
like to work with artists and more artists should be brought into 
the CI, while a firm active in circular economy missed garbage 
collection and transportation competences. These are clearly 
CAs with ideas and allowing them to explore them might result 
in a peripheral player becoming a local hub, possibly a key play-
er in the future. What will artists have in common with garbage 
collectors is another story.
Geographical distance
One might think that in the 21st century technology crosses 
distances and makes the classical definition of clusters where 
geographical proximity is stressed outdated. Perhaps this is true 
for general communication, but travelling time has been men-
tioned in both CIs as a serious problem inhibiting cooperation. 
People find travelling expensive and inconvenient and prefer ac-
tivities near their own location. In CI B distance – we are talking 
about a 30 mins ride – is the main risk, or at least serious ob-
stacle for cooperation. In CI A distances can be even larger and 
some CAs mentioned travel as the main cost of participation. 
The findings of Gaspar & Glaeser (1998) confirm this point.
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7 Conclusions
In the following we interpret our results, compare it to similar 
findings in the academic literature, characterise the “ideal” CI 
from the point of view of cooperation. We close with a sum-
mary of the main findings and with a set of open questions/
hypotheses. 
7.1 Literature
While we believe that ours is the first work to investigate CIs 
from a game theoretic perspective, several studies have been 
published that explored the cooperation network of CIs. 
While this is only part of our story it is interesting to see the 
 conclusions. 
Iammarino & McCann (2006) present an excellent recent sur-
vey of results, moreover they use a similar classification system 
to the one we use to describe successful CIs. Their purpose is 
to overview the literature and based on the documented case 
present a classification that explains why are there so many dif-
ferent CIs. They also explicitly address the dynamics of change 
in CIs. One must note that the discussed studies use various 
means to describe CIs often using tools that were not available 
to us. For instance, while our notion of “contact” depended on 
self-reporting, Gaspar & Glaeser (1998) looked at patterns of 
telephone usage to conclude that face-to-face and telephone 
contacts are complements, not substitutes, that is we call those 
people more who we also meet. Technology, it seems, cannot 
replace personal communication and therefore geographical 
proximity plays an important role. Discussing the geo graphy-
firm-industry relationship they identified three main types: in 
pure agglomeration the benefits of participation come from the 
size of the CI – to some extent CI A meets this description. In an 
industrial complex the characteristics of certain industries forces 
companies to make long-term commitments for cooperation by 
locating themselves near to each other. The third type is social 
networks, like CI B, where the CI is built on existing cooperation 
and the driving force is trust. They treat the old and the new 
social networks separately as the old ones usually operate in 
traditional industries, the new ones (CI B is an example) in high-
tech sectors.
7.2 The nature of cooperation in CIs
Cooperation in CIs has three aspects, when discussed from a 
game theoretic perspective. The first is intensity: value genera-
tion, structure and balance: value distribution. The following 
lessons can be learned about good practices for cooperation.
7.2.1 Value generation
The interviews have revealed that participation in the knowl-
edge flow, such as sharing information on market trends is 
ranked high among sought benefits of cluster participation. Af-
ter joining a CI each actor is free to decide its level of participa-
tion, such as, its level of sharing. Considering this as a non-co-
operative game, we look for the Nash equilibrium of this game: 
this technical concept describes a possible strategy for each CA 
with the property that no CA would benefit from choosing a 
different strategy assuming that the rest stick to their old one. 
In our example this would mean describe a level of sharing such 
that no CA gains by sharing more or by sharing less. There may 
be more Nash equilibria and one of these is where the CI is 
completely dysfunctional, where no-one shares. If one of the 
CAs would change its mind and started to share information, all 
the benefits would go to other CAs. Obviously the question is 
whether there are more cooperative forms of cooperation that 
can be sustained as equilibria. 
This problem goes well beyond the scope of CIs and is generally 
termed as the voluntary provision of public goods: how to make 
free parties make efforts to the benefit of others? Well, there 
are at least two aspects of CIs that can help cooperation: one 
is long term cooperation and the second is, what we may call a 
multiplicator effect. 
It is a well known result that long term cooperation can sustain 
virtually any strategy profile: As long as the initial effort levels 
are maintained, cooperation continues, but as soon as there are 
cheaters, cooperation breaks down. When CAs are sufficiently 
foresighted, the future gains of cooperation outweigh the one-
time benefits of cheating. 
This is especially true when the gains of cooperation are high, 
when cooperation is rewarded by, for instance, external fund-
ing, but especially when the joint efforts “multiply”, The ide-
al CI will consist of stag-hunters, who trust each other, 
spare no time and money and go for intensive coopera-
tion, which is then reinforced by the prospect of long-
term cooperation.
7.2.2 Balance: value distribution
The fundamental distributional problem of public goods is that 
those who provide the good may be different from those who 
benefit from it. As long as the imbalance is temporary, the re-
versal of the roles releases the associated tension, but if it is 
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lasting, some CAs may feel that others are free-riding on their 
efforts. With a substantial multiplication effect they benefit 
from even a very small input from the less committed CAs, but 
there may be a point where the CI is more effective without 
some free-riders. One solution to this problem is to implement 
compensation mechanisms, such as a higher participation fees 
for free-riding CAs, which can also act as incentives for more in-
tensive cooperation. Such mechanisms are currently in consid-
eration in Cluster B. Note that one tends to think that we must 
seek free riders among the less active CAs, while this is typically 
not so: passive CAs are less likely to benefit from their (loose) 
participation. One must also deal with new CAs separately, as 
they will often be temporary free riders, but here high charges 
would not be very welcoming. 
Another solution is to create mechanisms to sanction lack of co-
operation with discontinued or second-rate membership. Un-
fortunately current policies encourage CIs to widen cooperation 
disregarding the optimal CI size and the depth of cooperation. 
With stricter participation rules CAs would be forced to elevate 
their level of involvement.
Services provided by the CM add to the prize of cooperation, 
but if services are non-differentiated and so also free-riders ben-
efit, these services do not increase the incentives for coopera-
tion.
The ideal CI should reward cooperators and disincentivise 
free-riders.
7.2.3 Structure
There are many ways for CAs to connect: R&D cooperation, 
joint business projects, joint applications for funding, they may 
simply be trading partners, provide services to each other, or 
simply know each other: future projects are built over these, of-
ten looser forms of cooperation. The importance of the CM as 
a matchmaker to foster the formation of such links cannot be 
overestimated. We assume that projects can only be built over 
connected sets of firms: if the participants of a project is split 
into two groups, there must be at least one CA of each group 
who know each other. Without this the two groups do not trust 
each other or cannot even communicate. 
The two CIs studied are based on two distinct models of co-
operation. CI A is a managed cooperation network, where the 
CM has strong ties to each CA and as part of its services it can 
set up project teams on demand. CI B is a peer-to-peer coopera-
tion network, where the CM has more of an administrative role, 
cooperation is decentralised, links are formed directly between 
the CAs.
If a CA seeks a partner with a particular competence (that is 
available in the CI), it can get this very easily in a managed 
cooperation network: it needs only to ask the CM since all 
available competences are 2 links away. In a peer-to-peer co-
operation network there are no such guarantees, and the 
search costs depend highly on the network structure. Here the 
flight network between airports is a good reference: by having 
a group of well-connected hubs it does not usually take more 
than 3 or 4 flights to reach even the most remote destination. 
The snowflake structure has this feature: when the key CAs are 
well connected, CAs connected to them have good access to 
each other. The network structure of CI B is just slightly worse 
than that: the network's graph has a diameter of 5, so it takes 
at most 5 connections to contact the most remote actors. The 
ideal CI must therefore have several of the most active players 
well connected to each other to build up redundancies. The 
ideal CI is also open for new CAs, who are typically less con-
nected initially. 
A CA is critical to a project if connectivity breaks with its exit. 
CAs who are often critical in projects are critical to the success 
of the entire CI, too. Critical CAs create risks for the CI: their de-
parture drastically reduces the scope for cooperation and may 
result in the CI falling apart. CIs with a star structure, with a 
firm or possibly the CM in the centre would fall apart after the 
departure of the central firm. Risks of this type negatively affect 
the cooperation effort of CAs, by reducing long-term benefits. 
The risk can be mitigated if the centre of the star is a profession-
al CM firm with contractual agreements that guarantee long-
term reliability. Such risks apart the star structure could be more 
efficient as the central actor can efficiently link other CAs and 
generate much peer-to-peer collaboration. Evidence, however 
shows that it cannot, or at least so far the number of peer-to-
peer connections is almost negligible. Such a network seems 
very efficient in one sense, but apparently difficult to manage in 
another. Two more networks have been considered: The circle 
network, which has local cooperation centres, but these do not 
directly know each other - probably only via the CM; and the 
haystack, which is the random benchmark.
The snowflake-structure is therefore a good compromise 
between risk and distance between CAs, with a dense-
ly connected inner core and additional CAs connected 
 according to their level of participation.
7.3 Implications for funding and  
 managing cluster initiatives
Targeting an ideal CI there are a number of lessons learned 
based in the finding of this study, targeting the funding (policy) 
as well as the operational (cluster management) level.
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7.3.1 Cooperation and funding
First of all, recall that a CI is a large number of cooperating com-
panies in geographical proximity. Thus: a large number of firms, 
in particular: cooperating firms. But it seems neither of these – 
otherwise successful – CIs has fully explored both aspects of 
being a CI. So far we have been looking mostly at the first one: 
having a large number of firms and successful CIs were thought 
to be characterised by a large and increasing participation. This 
puts a lot of pressure on small CIs to keep CAs practically at all 
costs, stopping the natural in- and outflow of CAs. Focussing 
on and evaluating CIs by their key actors and on overall statis-
tics only would remove this constraint.
Enhancing cooperation is a lot more difficult. An initial ring of 
firms grows in a busy criss-cross of contacts and cooperation like 
a tiny crystal grows in a concentrated solution. How to support 
growth? One of our findings was that the more firms put into a 
CI, the more they can get out. External funding currently tends 
to replace cooperation effort resulting in CIs that lack peer-to-
Aspect Ideal CI Alternatives and their risks
Goal of participation Cooperation benefits
Free (public funded) services – these 
attract free-riders and disincentivise 
cooperation
Costs Substantial time/money contributions
Free membership - low commitment
High cooperation costs – barrier to 
cooperation
Funding
No long-term reliance on only external 
funds
Top-down CI with publicly funded CM – 
risk of addiction to free services
Trust Elevated trust level in CI
CI brings on trust benefits – cooperation 
is risky
Cooperation strategy Stag hunt Rabbit hunt – why to have a CI?
Initiatives From various CAs From CM – likely shortage of variety
Time-span Long term, open-ended projects
Few, fixed term projects – reduces co-
operation effort, increases free-riding
Cooperation intensity Many direct links
Indirect connections – ideas “lost in 
transmission”
Access to knowledge
Managed cooperation or dense snow-
flake network
Decentralised cooperation – required 
competence may be too far. 
Vulnerability Low, due to peer-to-peer cooperation
Managed cooperation – CM is a very 
critical actor in the network of cooper-
ation
Centre vs. periphery
Periphery has connection to multiple 
“hubs”
Unique access points – too much cen-
trality power leads to biased allocation of 
resources
Competences Balanced competences
Short competences – unequal coopera-
tion benefits, imbalanced allocation of 
resources
Table 7: The ideal CI
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peer contacts. Growth is supported by funding that is comple-
mentary to cooperation efforts and not a substitute. This is es-
pecially problematic with “top-down” CIs that do not have the 
existing core of cooperation, the “crystal” to start the process.
In terms of the stag hunt game model, cooperation is more like-
ly if the rewards of cooperation (with respect to the rewards of 
noncooperation) are higher or if others' claims of hunting the 
stag are credible, trustable. The first is precisely where external 
funding can help. External funding can add to the benefits be 
won in the form of subsidies, free workshops or trainings or 
other services, but beware that the general support of CIs ben-
efits cooperators and non-cooperators alike, actually reducing 
the cooperation benefits in relative terms. 
External funds are helpful and in the case of top-down clusters 
even essential in the initial stage of a cluster. Funding lowers 
the barrier to join the CI and thereby facilitates a high growth 
in size. This growth, however is a mere growth in quantity and 
not necessarily in quality as well. Funding attracts free riders 
and invites passive actors to step in adversely affecting the com-
position of the CI. With free riders present, also active CAs will 
be reluctant to make cooperation investment due to the higher 
risk of losing that investment. In the absence of trust CAs will 
act more noncooperatively inhibiting a growth of peer-to-peer 
connections. Mature CI should therefore not rely on (substan-
tial) external funding for their daily business, although it is clear 
that in the absence of a cooperative attitude, when CAs are not 
ready to make investment in the CI, a sudden change in the 
funding regime – a drop in funding can lead to the termination 
of cluster activities.
7.3.2 Managing cluster initiatives
Trust must be earned, but with frequent contact and com-
munication CAs get to know each other and one can “trust” 
another firm better if its behaviour is predictable. We must not 
fully ignore cultural aspects, but in the CI where the network 
of cooperation was denser, more respondents (80% vs. 33%) 
trusted fellow CAs more than firms in general. 
CMs have, of course, an instrumental role in link formation. 
Links form when a CA of the manager brings together uncon-
nected CAs in a project or at an event (as in Figure 17). While 
CAs face a trade-off between weakening their position in the 
network and increasing the overall value of the CI, that is, the 
choice between a larger slice of a small, or a smaller slice of the 
larger cake, CMs have the sole incentive to increase the cake. 
They should, by knowing the CAs well, keep track of the of-
fered and sought competences and offer a kind of a matching 
service between these. 
CMs must understand the different positions or types of CAs. 
Active actors (Figure 18, highlighted in red) are the pearls of 
the CI. These actors are fundamentally cooperative and – in the 
right circumstances – they are the actors who go for the stag. 
They are key to the strategy and service development. Since 
they are the most active and they are the ones responding to 
initiatives they are also the core target group for the CM; their 
wishes must be respected and requests satisfied. Active actors 
are also the key to turn passive, non-cooperative CAs into ac-
tive, cooperative ones. 
Reactive actors (Figure 18, highlighted in blue) are the reserves 
of the CI. As sleeping giants they bring growth potential – as 
soon as they can be converted into active actors. They should 
be involved in the strategy development, but without high ex-
pectations in terms of input. Such actors are currently focussing 
more on private, rather than public benefits, rather than the 
Figure 17: Link formation among two unconnected firms in a project
Figure 18: Different roles in the CI: highlighted CAs are the key actors
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well-being of the CI, they are interested in hunting rabbits, but 
may perhaps be tempted to go stag hunting. One can tempt 
them with profitable project opportunities, but transparency, 
getting to understand their positions, interests and providing 
them with information may help to overcome barriers of trust 
and cooperation.
7.3.3 Services offered by CM
How to translate this into practical terms? What does it means 
for cluster managements developing and implementing busi-
ness support services? The key lessons learned is that the type 
of services or added-value created and implemented by the 
cluster managements can not be seen disconnected from trust 
and openness for cooperation. In most cases, business support 
serviced offered by cluster managements depend on the com-
petence of the cluster management, the strategy of the CI or 
of the interest of the CAs. The study has shown that this is not 
really the most promising way. Services offered by the cluster 
management has to be actively absorbed by the CAs. If ser-
vices are offered which require strong trust and mutual open-
ness among the targeted CA (Figure 19), but the CAs are not 
ready or willing to behave properly, all related actions will fail 
(CM offers to go for stag hunting but nobody of CA joins). For 
instance, joint product development or joint R&D is the most 
risky undertaking within a CI. It is risky (failure possible), but 
can great big profit (if successful). No public funding can lower 
this risk (it is similar like the stag hunting). Only those CAs will 
participate which are ready to take the risk. Trust, willingness 
for cooperation and readiness to invest are mandatory precon-
ditions. If the cluster management offers support in this direc-
tion, but there are no or not enough CAs to join, nothing will 
happen. Meaning, the service might be good and the demand 
exists, but nobody dares to take risk and trusts each other.
Based on this assumption, the spectrum of services offered or 
designed for CAs has to be appropriate to the real intension of 
the majority of CAs and the trust and openness among them. 
Figure 20 displays the dependency of services offered by CM of 
trust and openness among the CAs. When having a closer look 
why so many (young) CI focus on services with a grouped in 
the left bottom area of Figure 20. These services will always be 
absorbed by CAs since low trust is needed. Free-riders do like it, 
since they don't need to open and can easily gains small ben-
efits (rabbit hunting). It also becomes clear why many CI fail to 
design a (real) common strategy. Because CAs have to be open 
minded, sharing ideas and needs among each other. This is only 
possible with a minimum of trust and openness. Free riders will 
benefit but not contribute. If CAs do have the feeling that there 
is no common base of contribution and trust, the CI strategy 
remains a fake or is done by a small group who trust (or done 
by CM himself). 
The cluster activities will therefore depend on the composition 
of the CI and the general cooperation attitude. Figure 19 groups 
typical services offered by CM intended for active,  trustful CAs 
(upper right area) and reactive CAs (lower left area). 
Figure 20: Activities among CA dependent on the level of cooperation
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Figure 19: Services offered by CM vs. level of trust required among CA
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There is no good and bad. Even CI can be considered to be 
a success when most CAs are reluctant and not really open 
minded to share trust. Provided they will for “served” by proper 
services offered by the CM. The benefits are quite low (rabbit 
hunting), but also the investments (and no need to trust and 
open itself). But such a CI will fail if the CM strives for more and 
trying to implement services and common actions that requires 
more (trust and investments like stag-hunting). 
On the other side, if there is a trustful cooperation attitude 
within a CI, CAs will be disappointed and dissatisfied, if the 
services offered by the CM are mostly those mentioned in the 
bottom area of Figure 19. It is like if the CAs want to hunt stag, 
but the CM supports them in hunting rabbits.
7.4 Robustness 
While some of our conclusions seem rather clear and crisp we 
must note that our work is based on less than 40 interviews 
in only 2 CIs. Previous work does not seem to contradict our 
findings but a large number of interviews would help to make 
the conclusions robust.
Taking this into account, an additional round of interviews 
among CAs of the CI A has been just been conducted. About 
50 responds have been collected. Based on the previous find-
ings and lessons learned, some questions have been sharped or 
slightly modified. Thus the results are not one to one compa-
rable with those of the first round. The main outcomes of the 
second round are given in the appendix. 
The findings of the second round clearly back the robustness 
of the methodology of the study and are well in line with the 
outcomes of the first round. However, additional activities shall 
be implemented to further test the robustness of applied meth-
odology.
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Appendix A: Questionnaire for cluster managers
1. What is the main profile of the cluster?
2. What are the prevailing markets the cluster members are active in?
3. Who are the main (cluster) actors operating in the respective markets?
4. What the key factors to succeed in these markets (activities, competences, features)?
a)  b)  c)  d) 
5. Do the cluster actors have any specialisation in these markets?
yes: no
6. What is the role of the entire cluster in these markets? 
key players influential players market participant / followers
7. When was the cluster (initiative) founded?
8. What was the initial goal to form the cluster?
9. What was the original number of founding members / what is it now?
10. How many cluster actors stepped out since then / how many joined?
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11. What are the main rights and duties of members (committed actors)?
rights: 
duties: 
12. Describe the cluster's mechanisms for governance, decision making process, sharing tasks etc.
13. What links cluster actors? What are the common competences?
14. Are competences well balanced within the cluster? 
yes no, we have … 
… too much of … too little of
15. What is the usual form of cooperation within the cluster?
regular projects at the cluster level regular projects for smaller teams 
ad-hoc projects at the cluster level ad-hoc projects for smaller teams
16. What is the content of cooperative projects successfully implemented in the cluster? Give examples.
17. How many members are involved…
…in each project ...in most projects …occasionally …never 
18. Have cluster projects ever failed?
yes no
19. If yes, how many cluster actors were involved ….
… in each failed project … in most projects … occasionally … never 
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20. If yes, were the members involved in the successful and the failed projects different?
no, the same yes, some are more successful yes, incidentally
21. What are the plans of the cluster in a nutshell (short-, medium-, and long-term)?
22. Which of the following thematic priorities are most important for the cluster and why?
collaborative technology development, R&D, technologie transfer  
information exchange and matchmaking (within the cluster)  
development of human resources or training of cluster actors   
development of entrepreneurship  
matchmaking and networking with externals   
acquisition and distribution of funding   
business activities   
23. Do you have a set target date to realise cluster goals? Do you plan beyond? 
24. Who are the main actors in the cluster?
25. Are there companies who are important for the cluster but are not members?
Company:  Its role and the reason for not being a member: 
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26. How are conflicts managed within the cluster? 
27. Which of the following structures describe your cluster best?
centralised “snowflake” decentralised random
28. The distribution of cluster members according to their level of involvement (number)
Proactive members taking own initiatives  
Active members supporting cooperation  
Passive members, but receptive to others' initiatives  
Passive members irresponsive to initiatives
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Appendix B: Questionnaire for members
1. Please name your firm. 
2. Number of employees  Annual revenue  
3. When did you join the cluster?  
4. Why did you join the cluster?
5. What is your business profile and how does it fit the cluster's activities?
6. What competences you have that are valuable for the other cluster actors?
a)  b)  c)  d) 
7. Have any of these become important within the cluster?
yes: no
8. Please rank your expectations connected with your cluster membership? (1 = low – 5 = high)
Access to  
knowledge
Human develop-
ment / training 
Joint R&D, product 
development
Networking / match-
making 
Business generation 
(without R&D)
Access to public 
funding 
Improved image and 
reputation 
Others:
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9. Rank to what extent your expectation have been fulfilled (1 = low – 5 = high)
Access to  
knowledge
Human develop-
ment / training 
Joint R&D, product 
development
Networking / match-
making 
Business generation 
(without R&D)
Access to public 
funding 
Improved image and 
reputation 
Others:
10. If you would have to invest into one of the following projects, which one would you choose?
Guaranteed € 100k or   25% chance for € 500k, otherwise no profit 
10% chance of € 1.25 M, else none, or 40% chance of € 250k, otherwise none.
11. Would you pay for an airport service that allows you to use the fast line at airport security?
no yes, about this much:  EUR
12. How much would you pay for a taxi to cut travel time by half an hour? 
 EUR
13. Have you made a cost-benefit analysis before joining the cluster?
no yes, our expected revenue growth is: 
14. What are your investments associated with membership or involvement in the cluster work?
Monetrary investments (membership fees…)  EUR 
Investment of time (person hours / days)  hours
15. Which of the following structures describe your cluster best? Circle your firm on the „map“.
centralised “snowflake” decentralised random
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16. Which of the following describes your level of involvement in the cluster?
Proactive members taking own initiatives 
Active members supporting cooperation 
Passive members, but receptive to others' initiatives 
Passive members irresponsive to initiatives
17. Who are the key actors within the cluster?
18. Would you like to see additional firms in the cluster?
no yes, these:
19. Which cluster actors do you expect or plan to cooperate with – perhaps you already do?
20. Which additional members is cooperation most likely with?
21. Suppose there is a very valuable project for teams of 5–10 cluster actors. Who would you like to, ideally, team up with? 
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22. Who would you share sensitive information with for potential benefits? Check all that apply. 
Our company pre-screens all its partners.  Actors of the cluster are more trustworthy. 
We only trust firms we personally know.  We feel no discomfort sharing our information.  
We generally trust firms, cluster membership has nothing to do with this.
23. Which cluster actors would you share sensitive information with?
24. What is your strategy for cooperation?
We actively seek opportunities, and so actively share and participate in knowledge flow. 
We look for competences that are useful for us.  
We present our competences and hope to raise the interest of other members. 
Other: 
25. How far do you plan to maintain your membership and current strategy?
 years
26. Overall, is cluster membership / involvement beneficial for you?
yes no
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Appendix C: Main Results from second survey 
After the main part of the study was done, an additional round 
of interviews among CA of the CI A has been conducted. 
About 50 additional responds have been collected. Based on 
the previous findings and lessons learned, some questions had 
been sharped or slightly modified before the second round. 
Thus the results are not one to one comparable with those of 
the first round. The findings of the second round clearly back 
the robustness of the methodology of the study and are well in 
line with the outcomes of the first round.
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Figure 23: Distribution of active and passive actors within CI A
Figure 24: Cost-benefit analysis as tool for decision making
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Figure 25: Monthly costs (personal efforts, membership fees etc.) connected with the involvement in cluster based-cooperation
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Figure 27: Number of different contacts (with other actors of CI A) in certain time periods
Figure 28: Trust among CA and non CA (First round: red, second round: blue) 
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Figure 29: Plans for future participation strategy
Figure 30: Satisfaction rate with cluster management
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